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Abstract
We address the phenomenon of sedimentation of opinions in networks. We in-
vestigate how agents who never change their minds (“stubborn”) can influence
the opinion of a social group and foster the formation of polarised communities.
We study the voter model in which users are divided in two camps and repeatedly
update their opinions based on others they connect with. Assuming a proportion of
the agents are stubborn, the distribution of opinions reaches an equilibrium. We
give novel formulas based on Markov Chain analysis to compute the distribution
of opinions at any time and speed of convergence to stationary equilibrium. Theo-
retical results are supported by numerical experiments on synthetic data, and we
discuss a strategy to mitigate the polarisation phenomenon.
1 Introduction
We are interested in how opinions evolve within a connected group of users. Namely, we study
the well-known voter model, in which each user holds one of two possible opinions and updates it
randomly under the distribution of others’ beliefs. Independently introduced by Clifford and Sudbury
(1973) and Holley and Liggett (1975) in the context of particles interaction, this model allows to
describe in a simple and intuitive manner social dynamics where people are divided between two
parties and form their opinion by observing that of others around them.
Online social platforms have gained a tremendous importance over the past decade. We use them
to get in touch with each other and instantly share any type of content over the world. Combined
with ease of access and use, this wide range of possibilities has made them leading actors of today’s
world. This is why getting a thorough understanding of how people connect and interact within social
groups is becoming even more pressing and strategic.
We consider a group of users where everyone is influenced by everyone else, and assume some of
them are stubborn and never change opinion. They can represent lobbyists, politicians or activists for
example. Long time dynamics and expected limiting behaviour of such processes have been subject
to several studies (Mobilia et al., 2007; Yildiz et al., 2013; Mukhopadhyay et al., 2020). Others
(Pariser, 2011, amongst others) highlight in particular that this endeavours polarisation of opinions.
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The novelty of our work is that we unveil step-by-step macrodynamics of the process through Markov
Chain modelling and provide closed form formulas for the computation of convergence times.
In addition, we apply our findings to study the problem of reducing the polarisation of opinions. In
recent years, recommendation algorithms on social platforms have greatly enhanced confirmation
bias by showing users content that is the most susceptible to match their interests – the so-called
“filter bubble” effect (Pariser, 2011). As a consequence more and more isolated, tightly clustered
online communities of similar-minded individuals have arisen in various domains such as politics
(Conover et al., 2011; Baer, 2016), science (McCright and Dunlap, 2011) or healthcare (Holone,
2016). We show that within the voter model framework, this phenomenon of opinions polarisation
can be mitigated by adding links between fully-connected communities.
2 The voter model
Here we describe the classical voter model and we introduce the notation that will be used throughout
the paper. We consider a group of n users labelled 1, . . . , n who hold individual opinions in t0, 1u.
These are prone to change over time and we let xiptq denote the opinion of user i at time t. Each
user has access to the opinion of some of the others, called her neighbours. Users can then be
seen as forming a graph of n nodes, with an edge from j from i if and only if i has access to the
opinion of j. The process unfolds as follows. Starting with a given initial distribution of opinions, an
independent exponential clock of parameter 1 is associated to each user. Whenever a clock rings, the
concerned user changes her opinion to that of one of her neighbours selected uniformly at random –
or equivalently, chooses her new opinion by sampling the distribution of her neighbours’ opinions.
We say that consensus is reached if almost surely all users eventually hold the same opinion, i.e. for
all i, j P t1, . . . , nu:
P pxiptq “ xjptqq ÝÑ
tÑ8 1.
We then have the following fundamental result.
Theorem 1. Consensus is reached over any finite strongly connected social graph.
We refer the reader to Aldous and Fill (2002, Chapter 14) for a proof based on coalescing random
walks and Yildiz et al. (2010, Theorem 2.2) for another one using Markov Chain modelling. The
intuitive idea is that no matter the current number of opinion-1 and opinion-0 holders, there exists a
succession of individual opinion changes with strictly positive probability that results in everyone
having the same opinion.
In this paper we place ourselves in clique, that is a community of users who all know each other. We
will call it user or social graph without distinction. This results in the following assumption that holds
throughout the paper, with the exception of Section 6.
Assumption 1. The user graph we consider is a clique with unweighted edges and no self-loops.
Thus each user only accounts for the opinion of everyone except their own with no particular
preference. We look at macro dynamics of the voter model, that is, we consider the evolution of the
size of each party (opinion 0 and opinion 1). To this end we let N1ptq denote the number of opinion-1
holders at time t; it will be our quantity of interest. We assume N1p0q is fixed and let n1 denote its
value. We are interested in the particular situation where some of the agents are stubborn, that is
never change their opinions, and we describe the evolution of N1ptq over time. We denote by s1 and
s0 the numbers of stubborn opinion-1 and opinion-0 agents respectively. We write rmijsi,j to denote
the matrix with entry mij in the i-th row and j-th column and let eM denote the exponential of any
matrix M . Finally if Ω is a set we use PpΩq to indicate its powerset.
3 Related literature
Researchers have been studying the question of opinions evolution in social networks for almost
fifty years. Perhaps the earliest well-known work in this area is from DeGroot (1974) who studied
how a society of individuals may or may not come to an agreement on some given topic. Assuming
the society is connected and people repeatedly update their belief by taking weighted averages of
those of their neighbours, he showed that consensus is reached. Various other models have been
developed since, to tackle the question of under which circumstances and how fast a population is
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able to reach consensus. Amongst others, Friedkin and Johnsen (1990) introduce immutable innate
preferences, Axelrod (1997) studies the effect of confirmation bias, Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004)
assume individuals are perfectly rational and Jadbabaie et al. (2012) account for the influence of
external events.
The voter model that we consider here was introduced independently by Clifford and Sudbury (1973)
and Holley and Liggett (1975) in the context of particles interaction. They proved that consensus is
reached on the infinite Zd lattice. Several works have since looked at different network topologies,
wondering whether consensus is reached, on which opinion and at what speed. Complete graphs
(Hassin and Peleg, 2002; Sood et al., 2008; Perron et al., 2009; Yildiz et al., 2010), Erdös-Rényi
random graphs (Sood et al., 2008; Yildiz et al., 2010), scale-free random graphs (Sood et al., 2008;
Fernley and Ortgiese, 2019), and other various structures (Yildiz et al., 2010; Sood et al., 2008) have
been addressed. Variants where nodes deterministically update to the most common opinion amongst
their neighbours have also been studied (Chen and Redner, 2005; Mossel et al., 2014).
An interesting case to consider is the one where stubborn agents who always keep the same opinion
are present in the graph. Such agents may for example represent lobbyists, politicians or activists, i.e.
entities looking to lead rather than follow and who will not easily change side. One of those placed
within the network can singlehandedly change the outcome of the process (Mobilia, 2003; Sood et al.,
2008). If several of them are present on both sides, consensus is usually not reachable and instead
opinions converge to a steady-state in which they fluctuate indefinitely (Mobilia et al., 2007; Yildiz
et al., 2013).
Recently, Mukhopadhyay et al. (2020) considered agents with different degrees of stubbornness and
show that time to reach consensus grows linearly with their number. They also show that if one
opinion is initially preferred – i.e. agents holding that opinion have a lesser probability of changing
their mind – consensus is reached on the preferred opinion with a probability that converges to 1 as
the network size increases. Klamser et al. (2017) study the effect of stubborn agents on a dynamically
evolving graph, and show that the two main factors shaping their influence are their degrees and the
dynamical rewiring probabilities.
Lastly, theoretical solutions have been recently proposed to minimise polarisation of opinions
while preserving social structures as much as possible. Yi and Patterson (2019) formulate different
constrained optimisation problems under the Degroot and the Friedkin-Johnsen models. They provide
solutions in the form of optimal graph construction methods. Chitra and Musco (2020) consider
the Friedkin-Johnsen model and study the problem from the network administrator perspective.
They prove that dynamically nudging edge weights in the user graph can reduce polarisation while
preserving relevance of the content shown by the recommendation algorithm.
Our contributions. We study the impact of stubborn agents in the voter model when users form
a complete graph. We perform a novel Markovian analysis and develop closed form formulas for
the computation of exact convergence times and evolution of opinions distribution. To the best
of our knowledge this is the first time such work is conducted. We also apply our findings to
provide empirical evidence that adding random links between fully-connected communities can
mitigate polarisation. All code used for the simulations is available at https://github.com/
AntoineVendeville/HowOpinionsCrystallise.
Outline. In Section 4 we assume stubborn agents are found on one side only. In Section 5 we extend
our analysis to the case where each camp counts a few of them. Simulation results are shown to back
up the theory. Section 6 is devoted to our take on mitigating polarisation. In Section 7 we conclude
and discuss leads for future work.
4 Stubborn agents in one camp
4.1 Modelling
We consider the voter model as presented in Section 2 with a complete graph of n users amongst
whom n1 ą 0 initially hold opinion-1. Additionally in this section, we assume that some of them
are stubborn and will never change their minds. They form an inflexible core of partisans with great
power of persuasion over the whole population. This is formalized through Assumption 2.
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Assumption 2. A number s1 of opinion-1 holders are stubborn. The remaining n´ s1 users are free
to change their opinions.
Consequently the process unfolds as follows. We start by choosing uniformly at random n1 users
to hold opinion 1 and s1 amongst them to be stubborn. Each of the n users is associated with an
exponential clock of parameter 1. Whenever a clock rings, if the associated user is not stubborn she
chooses another user uniformly at random and switches her opinion to theirs. Equivalently, at the
times of a Poisson process of parameter n, we select a user uniformly at random and if she is not
stubborn, she changes her opinion to that of another user drawn uniformly at random.
Let N1ptq denote the number of users with opinion 1 at time t. The main idea at the basis of our
analysis is that it describes a birth-and-death process over the state-space ts1, . . . , nu with transition
rates #
qk,k´1 “ pk ´ s1qpn´ kq{pn´ 1q
qk,k`1 “ kpn´ kq{pn´ 1q
qk,k “ ´qk,k´1 ´ qk,k`1
(1)
for all s1 ď k ď n ´ 1. Indeed to move from state k to k ´ 1 we need a non stubborn opinion-1
holder to adopt the opinion of an opinion-0 user. There are k´ s1 non stubborn opinion-1 users and a
proportion pn´ kq{pn´ 1q of opinion-0 users, hence qk,k´1 “ pk´ s1qpn´ kq{pn´ 1q. We obtain
qk,k`1 via an analogous reasoning. Since the process only evolves by unit increments or decrements,
qk,j “ 0 if j R tk ´ 1, k, k ` 1u. Moreover we have qn,j “ 0 for all j and let Q “ rqijsi,j denote
the transition rate matrix. Finally since n is the only absorbing state and is reachable from any other
state, we have the following consensus guarantee.
Theorem 2. If Assumption 2 holds then almost surely all users end up with opinion 1 in finite time.
This is not surprising. Indeed we know (Theorem 1) that consensus is reached over any finite graph
without stubborn agents. Now if some users are not willing to abandon opinion 1, consensus cannot
be reached on opinion 0 and thus opinion 1 eventually prevails.
4.2 Expectation and convergence time
Two natural questions that come to mind are what is the expected value of N1ptq at any time, and
how long does it take for consensus to be reached. We provide answers to both. From Norris (1997,
Theorems 2.1.1 and 2.8.2) we know that the probability for a continuous-time Markov Chain with
transition rate matrix Q to go from state k to state ` in a time interval of length t is given by the
pk, `q-th entry of the matrix exponential etQ. Hence the expectation of N1ptq at any time can be
computed as follows.
Theorem 3. LetQ be the matrix with entries described in (1) and letN1p0q “ n1 be given. Assuming
there are s1 ą 0 stubborn agents with opinion-1, the expected number of opinion-1 holders at time t
is given by
EN1ptq “
nÿ
k“s1
k pn1,kptq. (2)
where pn1,kptq :“ retQsn1,k is the probability for the number N1ptq of opinion-1 holders to equal k
at time t.
Note that this is straightforwarldy obtained by combining results from Norris (1997, Theorems 2.1.1
and 2.8.2). Regarding convergence time, we want to find the expected time before state N1ptq is in
state n, from where it will not be able to move anymore. This is called the expected hitting time of
state n, and it can be computed using (Norris, 1997, Theorem 3.3.3).
Theorem 4. Let Q be the matrix with entries described in (1). Let hpnqk denote the expected hitting
time of state n when starting from state k. Then phpnqs1 , . . . , hpnqn q is solution of the linear system#
h
pnq
n “ 0,řn´1
j“s1 qi,jh
pnq
j “ ´1, for i “ s1, . . . , n´ 1.
(3)
Remark that because Q is tridiagonal, only three values in each sum are non zero. Thus the expected
hitting time from any state depends only on those from neighbouring states and transition rates to
these state.
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4.3 Simulations
We now provide empirical evidence and visual support for Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 through
numerical experiments. We place ourselves in a complete network with n “ 1000 users. We start
with n1 “ 250 opinion-1 holder amongst whom there is s1 “ 1 stubborn agent. We let the process
evolve for 150 time units. We repeat over m “ 100 simulations and then do the same for s1 “ 10 and
s1 “ 250. In Figure 1 (left) we plot the empirical number of opinion-1 holders at each step averaged
over all simulations with corresponding theoretical values obtained through Equation 2. Values were
calculated every 10 time units. We also show confidence intervals of the form„ĞN1ptq ´ φσˆpN1ptqq?
m
, ĞN1ptq ` φσˆpN1ptqq?
m

(4)
where ĞN1ptq and σˆpN1ptqq are respectively the empirical mean and the unbiased empirical standard
deviation of N1ptq over all simulations, m is the number of steps and φ is the 95% quantile of the
normal distribution. First of all, we notice that experiments supports the analysis as theoretical values
fall within the range of confidence intervals constructed from empirical means. Moreover we see that
the number of stubborn agents has an important impact on the dynamics of the process. With only
one of them N1ptq barely increases by 50% over 150 time units while when they are 250, consensus
is reached very early – roughly 30 times units, which corresponds to a 400% increase in N1ptq.
In Figure 1 (right) we plot expected hitting times of state n function of the initial number of opinion-1
holders. For n1 in t250, 600, 900u we show theoretical values obtained via Theorem 4, alongside
empirical averages over m “ 100 simulations with confidence bars from Equation 4. Here again
theoretical values fall within the range of confidence intervals constructed from empirical means. We
observe that the difference in convergence speed between different values of s1 is more sensible as
n1 get smaller. When only 10 of the users initially hold opinion-1, them all being stubborn compared
to just one will roughly reduce time to consensus by a factor of 5.
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Figure 1: Complete graph with 1000 users. Left: markers represent the empirical number of opinion-
1 holders at each step averaged over 100 simulations, while dotted lines follow theoretical values
from Equation 2. Shaded areas are confidence intervals obtained via Equation 4. Right: convergence
speed function of n1. Bars represent empirical values averaged over 100 simulations with confidence
intervals, while dotted lines follow theoretical values from Theorem 4.
5 Stubborn agents in both camps
5.1 Modelling
We extend the previous analysis by injecting s0 ą 0 stubborn agents in the opinion-0 camp, in
addition to s1 ą 0 stubborn ones with opinion 1. The remaining n´ s0 ´ s1 users are free to change
opinions. In that case consensus cannot be reached, as there will always be a stricly positive number
of users supporting each opinion. Rather, opinions reach a state of equilibrium in which they fluctuate
indefinitely (Mobilia et al., 2007; Yildiz et al., 2013). The number N1ptq of opinion-1 holders at time
t describes a birth-and-death process over the state-space ts1, . . . , n´ s0u with no absorbing state
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and the following transition rates for all s1 ď k ď n´ s0:$&%
qk,k´1 “ pk ´ s1qpn´ kq{pn´ 1q
qk,k`1 “ kpn´ k ´ s0q{pn´ 1q
qk,k “ ´qk,k´1 ´ qk,k`1.
(5)
Values are obtained via a reasoning analogous as in the previous section. We have qk,j “ 0 if
j R tk ´ 1, k, k ` 1u and qn,j “ 0 for all j.
5.2 Expectation and steady-state
As in the previous section we aim at finding the expectation ofN1ptq and evaluate time of convergence
to equilibrium. We start by looking at the first. To this end we adapt Theorem 3 with minor updates.
Theorem 5. Let Q be the matrix with entries described in (5) and let N1p0q “ n1 be given.
Assuming there are s0, s1 ą 0 stubborn agents with respective opinions 0 and 1, the expected number
of opinion-1 holders at time t is given by
EN1ptq “
n´s0ÿ
k“s1
k pn1,kptq. (6)
where pn1,kptq :“ retQsn1,k is the probability for the number N1ptq of opinion-1 holders to equal k
at time t.
This theorem can also be used to characterise the equilibrium of the process, but there exist more
interpretable ways. It is known that the stationary distribution pi of a Markov Chain with transition
rates matrix Q is solution of the linear system tpiQ “ 0, }pi}1 “ 1u, and even simpler formulas exist
for birth-and-death processes (Bocharov et al., 2011, section 1.5.7). Regarding the expectation at
equilibrium, we prove the following.
Theorem 6. Assuming there are s0, s1 ą 0 stubborn agents with respective opinions 0 and 1, the
expected number of opinion-1 holders at equilibrium is given by
Epi “ n s1
s0 ` s1 (7)
where pi “ ppis1 , . . . , pin´s0q denotes the steady-state distribution of N1ptq.
Proof. We know (Yildiz et al., 2013, Theorem 2.1) that the vector of individual opinions
px1ptq, . . . , xnptqq converges in distribution to a random vector px1˚ , . . . , xn˚q. From Yildiz et al.
(2013, Proposition 3.2) we have that Exi˚ is equal to the probability that a random walk on the
user graph initiated at node i is absorbed by the set of stubborn opinion-1 agents. Here we are in a
complete graph where all nodes are topologically equivalent. Thus the probability that a random walk
on the user graph starting at node i hits a stubborn opinion-1 agent before an opinion-0 one is simply
s1{ps0 ` s1q. Hence Exi˚ “ s1{ps0 ` s1q. Since there are n´ s0 ´ s1 such non-stubborn nodes and
s1 stubborn ones with opinion 1, we have
Epi “ s1` pn´ s0 ´ s1q Exi˚ (8)
and Theorem 6 ensues.
This theorem states that the proportion of opinion-1 users is expected to endlessly fluctuate around
the ratio s1{ps0 ` s1q. For example, having twice as many stubborn agents as the other camp will
on average lead to count twice as many partisans. Thus the camp that boasts the biggest quantity of
stubborn agents is expected to be of bigger size in the long run.
5.3 Convergence time
Given that there is no absorbing state here, the question of convergence speed requires different gear
that the expected hitting times we used previously. We look at the mixing time of our Markov Chain,
defined by
Tεpn1q “ inf tt ą 0, }pn1,¨ptq ´ pi} ă εu . (9)
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Intuitively speaking, this represents the shortest time length for the chain to be at distance lower than
ε from its stationary distribution. An abundant literature suggests to use the distance in total variation,
which for any two probability measures µ, ν on a set Ω is defined as
}µ´ ν}TV “ maxAPPpΩq |µpAq ´ νpAq|. (10)
In other words, total variation measures the biggest possible “disagreement” between µ and ν over
all events. As the set PpΩq is of size 2|Ω|, computing the above is intractable in most cases. Thus we
use a more convenient characterisation (Levin et al., 2017, Proposition 4.2):
}µ´ ν}TV “ 1
2
ÿ
xPΩ
|µpxq ´ νpxq|. (11)
This formula requires only |Ω| computations, making it much more usable in practice. The conver-
gence speed of the model is then obtained via the following.
Theorem 7. The mixing time of N1ptq with precision ε starting from state n1 is given by
Tεpn1q “ inf
#
t ą 0,
n´s0ÿ
k“s1
| pn1,kptq ´ pik| ă 2ε
+
. (12)
We now validate and illustrate Theorems 5, 6, 7 through numerical experiments.
5.4 Simulation
We place ourselves in a complete network with n “ 1000 users. For ps0, s1q “ p100, 50q and
p200, 250q we run m “ 100 simulations with starting values n1 “ 250, 750. Results are shown in
Figure 2 (left). We plot the empirical proportion of opinion-1 holders at each step averaged over
all simulations with confidence intervals (4) and corresponding theoretical values from Equation 6.
Values were calculated every 2 time units. We also show the expected limiting number of opininion-1
holders obtained via Theorem 6. Experiments supports the analysis as theoretical values fall within
the range of confidence intervals constructed from empirical means, and N1ptq converges towards
its limiting expectation ns1{ps0 ` s1q regardless of the initial state n1. Also, equilibrium is reached
quicker with ps0, s1q “ p200, 250q. A higher number of stubborn agents leaves less room for overall
change, making the system closer to stability.
Additionally in Figure 2 (right) we show theoretical mixing times function of n1. We take ps0, s1q “
p100, 50q then p200, 250q and let the precision threshold ε span t10´1, 10´2, 10´3, 10´4u. The sum
in Equation 12 was evaluated every dt “ 0.1 time unit starting from t “ 0, yielding an approximation
of Tεpn1q with error margin dt. Mixing times look symmetrical around the limiting expectation,
where they drop dramatically. Also, note that the constant gaps between curves might be due to the
regular spacing we chose for ε.
6 Reducing polarisation
We apply our model to study the problem of reducing polarisation. Namely, we look at two strongly-
opinionated, isolated groups of users and wonder how the addition of links between them can
moderate the balance of opinions. Consider a social graph divided in two cliques C0 and C1, i.e.
two internally fully connected groups of users, with no links between them. Each clique supports a
different opinion, users in C0 being more inclined towards opinion 0 and those in C1 towards 1. To
account for this, C0 counts a few stubborn agents with opinion 1, none with opinion 0 and an initial
majority of opinion-1 holders. Simarly for C1 with opposite opinions. Were there no links between
the two, according to Theorem 2 everyone in C0 would eventually hold opinion 0 and everyone in C1
opinion 1. We now show that adding connections between the groups can mitigate this effect, as we
conduct simulations of the voter model on the whole graph with varying numbers of links between
C0 and C1.
For our experiments we consider two cliques of 500 people each, thus forming a graph with 1000
total users. We first look at a symmetric case: C0 has 400 initial opinion-0 holders amongst whom
250 are stubborn, while clique C1 has 400 initial opinion-1 holders amongst whom 250 are stubborn.
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Figure 2: Complete graph with 1000 nodes. Left: for each of n1 “ 250 and n1 “ 750 we take
ps0, s1q “ p100, 50q and p200, 250q. Markers represent the empirical proportion of opinion-1 holders
at each step averaged over 100 simulations, while dashed colored lines stand for corresponding
theoretical values from Equation 6. Shaded areas are confidence intervals obtained via Equation 4.
Expected limiting values from Theorem 6 are plotted as constant grey dashed lines. Right: Theoretical
mixing time function of n1 with ps0, s1q “ p100, 50q, obtained via Theorem 7.
We add 12,500 links at random between the cliques (5% of all possible ones) and simulate the voter
model over 20 times unit. We do the same with 15% and finally 75% of all possible links. In Figure 3
(left) we plot the number of opinion-1 holders over time for each clique, averaged over m “ 100
simulations and with confidence intervals (Equation 4). We also show theoretical values of EN1ptq
were there no in-between links at all (obtained via Equation 2).
What we see is that adding links between the cliques indeed mitigates polarisation. A mere 5% of all
possible ones already yields a visible effect and prevents consensus to the favoured opinion in each
clique. Preferences are preserved, as putting even 75% of all possible links between the cliques still
leaves them strongly-opinionated. In Figure 3 (right) we break the symmetry by reducing the number
of stubborn opinion-1 agents in clique C1 to 50. In this case there is a clear unbalance between the
cliques. Users in C1 are less resistant to the attraction of opinion 1, and drawing 75% of all possible
in-between links is enough to make the clique switch sides and globally favour opinion 0. On the
other hand, while consensus is prevented, polarisation in C0 remains very strong.
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Figure 3: Polarisation reduction. Cliques C0 and C1 both count 500 users, the first favours opinion 0
and the second opinion 1. We simulate with different numbers of links between the cliques. Markers
represent empirical averages over 100 simulations for the number of opinion-1 holders in each clique,
taken every time unit. Shaded areas delimit confidence interval (Equation 4). Dotted lines represent
theoretical values when there are no links between the cliques. Left: C0 has 400 initial opinion-0
holders amongst whom 250 are stubborn, clique C1 has 400 initial opinion-1 holders amongst whom
250 are stubborn. Right: Identical setup except C1 has only 50 stubborn opinion-1 agents.
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7 Conclusion and future work
We have analysed the voter model on complete graphs with stubborn agents. We have given closed
form formulas for the expected number of opinion-1 holders over time and for convergence times.
In the case were stubborn agents are present on both sides we have also characterised the stationary
equilibrium of the process. Our analysis was supported through numerical simulations. Additionally
we have shown that polarisation of opinions can be reduced by adding links between strongly-
opinionated communities. Leads for further work include extending our analysis to other graph
models, considering different degrees of stubbornness and confirming the validity of our approach
through applications to real-life datasets.
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